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Introduction
Advanced economic instruments like econometric methods and, in particular, simulation models are enjoying an increased employment in practical antitrust. Since merger control must take a forward-oriented approach in the sense that it attempts to evaluate the likely effects on competition resulting from the merger, i.e. future effects, simulation models represent an especially attractive tool for an ex ante competition policy.
1 They are, however, somewhat connected to (ex post) econometric analysis, since the (most commonly gametheoretic oligopoly) models must be calibrated with past data in order to reproduce the relevant market as it is now. Against the background of the calibrated model, the effects of the proposed merger on market prices and quantities as well as on consumers and producers rents are predicted.
2
The availability of these advanced techniques to quantitatively predict merger effects plays an important role for the increasing economization of antitrust, starting with the sometimes labelled Post-Chicago antitrust policy in the U.S. (Brodley 1995; Baker 1999a; Hovenkamp 2001 ) and continuing for instance with the so-called more economic approach in European competition policy (Christiansen 2006; Neven 2006; Röller & Stehmann 2006; Budzinski 2008a) . 3 The practical use of these instruments as quantitative economic evidence, however, poses a couple of challenges. One obvious but important one is the need to identify the 'right'
-the most appropriate -model for any given case. This problem has two dimensions, (i) a policy dimension that refers to party interests (including experts working for the competition authority or the merging companies or their competitors/customers/suppliers) as well as to the problem whether law courts are sufficiently equipped to understand and appropriately deal with the proposed models, and 1 This stands in contrast to cartel policy that deals with detecting and sanctioning illegal collusion pursued by market participants and, therefore, necessarily represents an ex post competition policy. The third traditional area of antitrust, the governance of abusive and predatory strategies, in particular by dominant and powerful market leaders, somewhat represents a mixture of ex ante and ex post competition policy: while the controversial strategy usually is actually taking place at the point of time of the antitrust intervention, the ex post element, its effect on competition in the relevant market often at least partly relate to the future (f.i. the predatory strategy has not yet driven the adversely affected competitors off the market), the ex ante element. 2 "Merger simulation is an approach for predicting post-merger prices using information about pre-merger market conditions, while building on assumptions about the behavior of firms and costumers" (Weiskopf 2003) . 3 In Europe and in particular in Germany this has recently triggered a lively debate about the adequate role model and guiding principles for competition policy (e.g. Hellwig 2006; Mantzavinos 2006; Haucap 2007; Gormsen 2007; Schmidt 2007; Schmidt & Voigt 2007; Schmidtchen et al. 2007; Weizsäcker 2007; Budzinski 2008a Budzinski , 2008b Kerber 2008 ).
(ii) an analytical dimension that deals with the principal availability of a 'best' model, even if no political or procedural distortions existed.
While there is a considerable amount of literature on the policy dimension, little can be found on the analytical dimension. This paper demonstrates against the background of a simple meta-theoretical model that analytical limitations to the identification of the most appropriate model for any given merger proposal exist.
Merger Simulation Models in Antitrust
Merger Simulation Models (MSMs) are based upon assumptions regarding market behaviour of suppliers and customers and contain several parameters: l. Eventually, the new equilibrium after the merger must be simulated using the model that was calibrated with pre-merger empirical data but adjusting market shares to the post-merger situation.
While a -f (and l, of course) represent somewhat necessary elements of a MSM, g -k are
often treated more reluctantly due to inherent difficulties for adequate modelling. However, they nonetheless represent important features of the market that are to be simulated.
High hopes are connected to the use of MSMs in practical merger control. "Merger simulation (…) eliminates much of the subjective and idiosyncratic judgment otherwise inherent in the assessment of mergers" (Crooke et al. 1999: 206) and Werden (2005: 43) (Werden 2000) . In Kimberly-Clark/Scott (U.S. 1995), the developed MSM remained inconclusive regarding its results (Hausman & Leonard 1997) . 
A famous non-merger case with conflicting models about the (anti-) competitive effect is
Microsoft, where the economic experts of the parties (in studies and in testimonies) concluded welfare effects ranging from severe damages for consumer welfare up to compelling advantages for consumers due to immense efficiencies. This also triggered an academic debate that failed to reach a consensus about the appropriate model for this case (Bresnahan 2001; Fisher & Rubinfeld 2001; Gilbert & Katz 2001; Schmalensee 2001; Werden 2001; Evans et al. 2005) .
Different from forensic economics (and its methods), merger simulations deals with the prediction of effects that lie in the future. Therefore, they -for principle -entail a larger degree of uncertainty that, moreover, is more difficult to quantify, than forensic methods that attempt to identify facts of the past. This enhances the sensitivity of the instrument in regard to the adequateness of the model assumptions. Each MSM inevitably must simplify the underlying real case (complexity reduction) in order to create meaningful information. With the words of Joan Robinson (1962: 33) : "A model which took account of all the variegation of reality would be of no more use than a map at the scale of one to one."
At the same time, the inevitable simplification and complexity reduction offers scope for the construction of competing models and their injection into antitrust cases by interested parties -as it has happened in the some of the existing cases of the application of MSM (see above).
As a consequence, a selection problem comes into existence: which MSM among the competing proposals is most adequate for a given case, i.e. mirrors most closely the relevant features of the simulated real case / market? The multi-parameter character of merger cases (see above a -l) implies that different models with mutually contrary conclusions regarding the pro-or anticompetitive impact of a given merger proposal refer to differing ways of reducing real-world complexity. In other words, the elaborate modelling of one parameter usually comes at the expense of a stronger simplification of another, so that incompatible
MSMs of the same case simplify on different parameters or, respectively, put their modelling emphasis on different parameters. (ii) Apart from this reasoning, the analytical dimension refers to the theoretical availability of a 'best' model. If no distortions by biased experts, interested parties and insufficiently equipped authorities existed (ideal antitrust procedure), would it then be possible to unambiguously identify the most appropriate model among the available ones -given that each model must simplify reality?
A Simple Theory of the Comparative Fit of Merger Simulation Models

Merger Simulation Models and Reality: Modelling the Distance
As argued in the preceding section, MSMs must necessarily always simplify a given real case and reduce its complexity. Now let any real competitive market be characterised by parameters so that the vector 
Implications and Conclusion
This paper demonstrates that it can be theoretically impossible to identify the most appropriate simulation model for any given merger proposal. Due to the inevitable necessity to reduce real-world complexity and multi-parameter character of merger cases, the comparative fit of proposed MSMs with mutually incompatible predictions can be the same. This is valid even if an ideal antitrust procedure -i.e. the absence of partisanship among economic experts and the assumption of perfectly working authorities and courts -is assumed.
The paper does not argue, however, that it is never possible to say anything about the appropriateness of competing models. In particular, if MSMs violate common standards of accurateness and economic methods, it is very well possible to exclude such from a sound antitrust analysis (Werden et al. 2004; Solow & Fletcher 2006; Werden 2007 ). However, once specified standards are met by all MSM proposals, an identification of the 'best' might inevitably depend on a non-scientific value judgement since it cannot be selected unambiguously with scientific methods. This insight is important regarding two aspects. First, the scope for partisan economic evidence cannot be completely eroded in merger control, irrespective of the sophistication of procedures. It remains illusionary to assume that predictive economic evidence compels consensual and unambiguous assessments of welfare effects upon which economic experts will eventually agree. Second, the high hopes of replacing structural and more lump-sum antitrust analysis by quantitative case-by-case calculation of the actual effects must be limited. Simulation models do represent an additional instrument providing valuable insights. However, they cannot eliminate or substitute for qualitative reasoning and economically informed common sense.
